Hunterstown question (from Troy Harman's tour)

[TacticalBill]

Mr. J.D.
Sir:

I had hoped that you would have provided some documented sources so that I could consider something new and adjust if needed. But I have discerned some of your perspectives that I do not yet fully understand.

Might I ask what tactics manual you reference when you call this a "meeting engagement"? I have checked Jomini, the cirriculum at West Point during the time and other sources but I am obviously not using your definition. I am using the Army's Tactical Capstone manual, Field Manual 3-0, Operations. I did not "make up" the term "search and attack". Please check page 7-18 of that manual. It defines both "meeting engagement" and "search and attack". I think you might agree that search and attack fits better as the force assigned the mission is a security force versus a main battle force.

Jomini (Art of War page 179.) does use a "meeting on the march and collision of two armies" but he is talking about "armies" and not the security forces. After all if security forces do their job properly, meeting engagements would not happen because at least one side would know where the other is and the following action would therefore not qualify as a "meeting engagement".

But again perhaps you have a different manual...if you could pass that along I think we could proceed from the same sheet of music...

1. Gregg did not "ignore" Pleasanton's order but passed it on the Kilpatrick. See #3 below) Gregg was afterall in contact and could not pull back and move further the north and east without exposing the army's flank to those forces he was now fighting.

2. Pleasanton's note (which you admit Gregg got) specifies enemy locations, so again unless you have a different definition, when one side reports the enemy general location, it cannot be a meeting engagement...

3. Kilpatrick wrote in his report acknowledging this fact: "Received orders from HQ Cavalry Corps, thru BG Gregg to move over the road leading from Gettysburg to Abbottstown and see that the enemy did not turn our flank." So Kilpatrick had orders!

4. For Kilpatrick to get this order from Gregg, he had to make some contact with Gregg either directly or by courier. So we have Kilpatrick assuming the mission, but some would have me believe that neither Gregg tells Kilpatrick of the enemy reports he is to check out in the area and Kilpatrick never asks. Hardly!!! Pleasanton's instructions were to move "toward the Heidlersburg road to ascertain if the enemy is in that position in force." (page 490. part 3. ORs) This would be neglectful of both commanders to not pass on the enemy situation. Further "ascertain.... position in force" forces an offensive response by the Federals. Their mission is to not to report on cav but to determine if their are infantry forces in the area... Kilpatrick is required then to fight through any screening forces to accomplish the assigned mission.

5. I would agree that contact specifically at the exact spot at the exact time might have been unexpected but not to the extent that it is a meeting engagement. Intelligence is never that precise because units move over time as you are aware. A commander would indeed be a fool if he got a note two hours after it was issued and expected that there would be no change to the enemy situation. Contact at Hunterstown rather than along the Hiedlersburg Road can not be viewed as a complete surprise. The two towns are to close. And I would pont out that if the enemy was in force (infantry) along the Heidlersburg Road the Federals should have expected cavalry to the south and east of Heidlersburg for screening. So if you could list your sources, then I could assess why you believe as you do. After all there are surprises, then surprises, then meeting engagements.

6. Pleasanton did not have to know that Stuart was in the area by name. He did not mention cav but he did mention "force". I would not want to jump to a conclusion....You do not have to know who it is, only that there are reports of enemy in that area...

7. Your last paragraph is confusing. I did not say " Alf, or Meade, or whomever, observing Longstreet marching some 5 miles away..." Signal stations reported "enemy infantry, about 10,000 strong".... (Page 488, part 3 ORs). I asked who else could it be when considering the other reports as well --- "Deductive reasoning"/// as I said if the multiple reports were of different units in the aggregate, it could be Longstreet. Meade did not know this so he had to send cav to ensure his right flank was not turned. Do you know of any other two divisions of infantry unaccounted for other than Longstreet? Again I was using deductive reasoning just like Meade would have used.

8. I would ask that you quote me accurately. I took offense at the use of your word "silliness". I have documented all my sources and would ask that we maintain a level of decorum. If we are to learn (you and me) these "distractions" only divide rather than unite. I shall endeavor to treat all with courtesy and would expect likewise. If I fail please let me know. Thank you...

Bill

[RickAllen]

Bill ,dont take me the wrong way, but if I am understanding this thread correctly (and do let me know if I am not) the whole counter march of Longstreets two divisions is taken to have some impact on the Cavalry operations on the right flank of the AOP at Hunterstown?

Really? I must be misunderstanding something. Please prove it.

If this is the case, it smells like bullshit to me.

If I am wrong, please have me corrected by either yourself or a suitable mentor, because that is one BBBBBBIIIIIIIIIIIIIIGGGGGGGGGGGG
stretch.

And no, infantry forces moving north along and below Herrs Ridge does not seem to me a "proof" of any such actions.

What do I need to read? Who do I need to talk to? Where can I find such a solid corrolation that I dont think you are all on Meth?

Regards,

Rick

[James_Longstreet]

[The General]

Although I am loath to do this, it is clearly time for me, as moderator and the owner of this board, to step in. I try not to do this, as folks generally play by the rules. As long as they do, I'm perfectly content to allow discussions to run their course and to remain in the shadows, participating as a member and not as a moderator.

Every now and again, I must reluctantly don my other hat. Sadly, this is one of those instances.

I REALLY do not like the tone that this discussion is taking. Lighten it up, guys, and do it now, or this thread disappears. The personal stuff stops now.

Bill, with all due respect, you're new here. While your contributions are certainly welcome, and I have been impressed by your posts to date, the very fact of your newness means that you are not acquainted with us, and you're obviously not acquainted with how those of us who have known each other for years--and have spent time together in person--talk to each other. I did not think that JD's comment was out of line, and I clearly did not think it was meant to be a personal attack on you.

I regret that you took it as such, but if you're going to be among our midst, you're going to have to learn when something is a professional criticism and not a personal attack. There are other boards where a particular licensed battlefield guide is completely unable to draw that distinction, and blows a gasket every time that person's theory is challenged. The response, invariably, is to launch vicious personal attacks. That will NEVER happen here. I will not allow it. Bad Lieutenant Allen, I might suggest that you might want to dial it back a notch, too, please.

I guess what I'm saying is that if you throw something out there, you should expect it to be dissected, and you need to learn not to take it personally when it happens.

Please don't misconstrue what I'm saying as suggesting that neither you nor your comments are welcome here. That's as far from being the case as is possible. In point of fact, I welcome you and I welcome your intelligent viewpoint. I may not agree with you on this--and I don't--but I will zealously defend your right to have an opinion and to state it here as long as you play by our rules.

Let's play by the rules so I can go back to being a participant in the discussions again. I REALLY don't relish this particular role.

Eric
_________________
"If you want to have some fun, jine the cav'ry!"

[TacticalBill]

Sirs:
I did not take it as personal attack --- someone else attributed that I did...

nothing personal taken but professionally. I had a hope that comments provided professionally would be treated as such. I was hoping we could raise the level of understanding. Perhaps.....

As for heat, after two wars I really do not think any of you can stress me out. Of course you can try. This could be fun....

I ain't going nowhere unless the cite moderator throws me off. It won't be for bad manners.

Respectfully,
Bill

Perhaps now we can get past this and on to the points I tried to make.

[The General]

Bill,

I'm pleased to hear that.

And I quite agree.

As for the substance, I think some insight might help.

JD and I have spent the past couple of years diligently crafting a detailed narrative of Stuart's ride during the Gettysburg Campaign that will be published as a book next year. The Battle of Hunterstown obviously plays an important part in that story, and JD and I are, perhaps, a little too close to this whole thing. JD and I know as much about this episode as anyone and we have spent a lot of time discussing it.

Having said that, and having carefully reviewed your post and also the ones spelling out Troy's theory, I think that there are some elements that ring true, but I simply cannot accept that this is much more than a meeting engagement that played out as such.

Eric
_________________
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[James_Longstreet]

*Can we chalk up the WHOLE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG as 'the meeting engagement'? :drunken:
*Whoever saw a dead Cavalry man? :cyclopsani:
*Can we perhaps entice the good Col to lead a Tour into Hunterstown during the upcoming Muster? :bom:
* Is it live or Memorex? :cheers:

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Allan
Time sets all things right. Error lives but a day. Truth is eternal.
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[MarylandReb]

Thankfully I'm an idiot so I keep my mouth shut....I'm just a poor ol Johnny Reb in General Longstreet's army. :blackeye:
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Mark

[TacticalBill]

Sirs:

Troy's deductions are not the first time someone postulated that force near Herr Ridge being Longstreet. Colonel Bill Cameron - Gettysburg Magazine, issue 3, page 13 did so about 15 years ago. Perhaps old soldiers are more accustomed to accepting fragmentary intelligence and making analysis, rather than hindsight.

As for the entire battle being a meeting engagement, perhaps it depends again on the definition used but if it the one used today, Meade knew too much and he deployed 30% of his force (Reynolds wing and Buford) forward to a blocking defensive position as a measure based on that intel. As for Lee, one could easily see how he might think so. But again with today's definition both sides must be ignorant of the situation to classify it as a meeting engagement.

Bill

[JD]

Just was able to get back on the board this morning...

Yes, Bill, I hope you understand that I wasn't taking any shots at you. As Eric explained, because we've just completed a very detailed book on this subject, we've grown very close to this issue. My comments were in no way meant as an insult to you or anyone, my last post was simply a general wrap-up of many, many points that have been made here. The "silliness" remark was meant to apply to Harman's theory about Longstreet's march having anything to do with Hunterstown, not anything you said.

In actuality, I'm impressed with your research and the points you've made with the corresponding documentation. When I speak of "meeting engagement," I'm not referencing any particular manual definition. I have originals and copies of many 19th century manuals, so I am familiar with the terms and definitions, but I'm using the term in the sense that neither force was aware of the other when they collided. Same with Hanover on June 30 - I think all would agree that it was a "meeting engagement" in the classic sense of the term, although because of circumstances one could probably claim that it doesn't fit the strict definition of a particular manual. Kilpatrick had orders to front the center of the AOP and look for elements of the ANV... and there was much citizen intelligence of Stuart's whereabouts, as well as Ewell, Elijah White, etc. Therefore, one could make the assertion that by strict definition Hanover was not a meeting engagement - however, I will continue to call it that because to most folks' perceptions, that's indeed what it was. That speaks to the point you made about "the enemy's general location."

I think that gives you my feelings about the points you made about intelligence known by either side - granted much of it is true (although I think some of the specifics you mentioned are arguable and give more benefit to Pleasonton and Kilpatrick than is warranted) but that "meeting engagement" is indeed the term to apply to Hunterstown.

J.D.
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[JD]

Hi again Bill,

You must have been typing your post at the same time I was, so our last ones are a bit out of order :drunken:

I think to say that a "meeting engagement" necessitates ignorance on the part of both opposing forces is a bit of a stretch. You'd probably have difficulty finding many examples of such meeting engagements in all of the Civil War, based on that standard. I for one, though, wouldn't classify the battle of Gettysburg as a meeting engagement - I'll give you that - and have never done so. I always point out the fact that among other things, both Pettigrew's and Buford's pickets watched each other all night of June 30 along the Cashtown Road. Buford and Heth most certainly did not stumble into each other. Heth did expect to find some force in town - Pettigrew reported it and others - he simply didn't know their nature and numbers. And by Buford's dispatches of the 30th, we know he knew just about exactly where all 3 ANV Corps were. See my article in the July 2005 issue of "America's Civil War" magazine for more on that.

J.D.
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[Jungles]

[TacticalBill]

Folks:

I read the posts and had to sit and dwell on them for several hours... just to get my head on right..
1) Sometimes historians use technical military terms and over time they take on a different meaning all their own in that world. While technically not accurate, the words come to mean a generally accepted term in that body of people so they all use it with the same understanding.
Perhaps with my background as a tactics instructor for the military I'm being too rigid in trying to be militarily precise. It was hard enough trying to force my students to be precise. As with any profession, (even historians and writers have their own "set of disciplines" of which I am ignorant) that is our world and we live in that and think others understand it. Having said all that:

2) Meeting engagements are by definition supposed to be rare events. They occur when both sides are surprised, and each side of course should be doing all they can to prevent surprises. I spent a day of so reading on Hanover and that may qualify, but I need to do more work before I will commit to that.

3) Here are the two cases when one side is relatively sure of the enemy situation....If one side knows where the other is, and attacks by surprise he is a lucky attacker, but an attacker nonetheless. Likewise, if he knows where the enemy is and sits in defense awaiting an unsuspecting moving force, he is also lucky, but he is still defending. In both cases the side that is surprised is at a distinct disadvantage, but it is not a meeting engagement. Offense and defense according to Jomini.

4) At Gettysburg the cav was sent to ascertain if a force was there and to ensure the flank would not be turned. I took that to mean the cav was to go there and stay there to ensure the flank did not get turned. That is, the Fed cav was directed there early, not to meet that inf force in movement but be in position before that force ever arrives and prepare to prevent the flank from being turned.

5) If I am directed to go somewhere with the expectation I am looking for unit "a" and I go that area and find unit "b" instead, I should have prepared my unit for action before arriving. I would take precautions etc. I am surprised that I met another unit but they does not make it a meeting engagement, even if they know I am coming.

6) At Gettysburg so the Fedcav go there to ensure this infantry force does not turn their flank but they hit Stuart instead.... should not be classified as a meeting engagement technically.

7) Now suppose my intelligence is three hours old... and it says there is an infantry unit in a certain location. Say this infantry can move at 3 miles per hour. I should be prepared to meet them anywhere within 9 miles of the initial location (3 miles hours for 3 hours). I should have no excuse for being surprised within that entire zone.

8) Taking the above, one of Pleasanton's notes (I think 10:40) says the enemy is on those roads in that area. (not necessarily Longstreet or Stuart by name, just enemy) Three hours later I direct a force to that area preparing to prevent unit "a" from turning my flank. If a commander comes back and tells me he got there 6 hours after my 10:40 report and was surprised by a force (unit "b") about 5 miles from the location in that report, I gotta think his brain ain't working on all cylinders.
So Kilpatrick acting on intel several hours old should not have been surprised to meet a force 5 hours south of Heidelersburg.

9) So I gotta overcome that line of logic before I can rethink this for Feds.

10) On the other hand, reading the Hampton report, he says he was directed back to Huntertown because of Fed Cav was there. He should have had the upper hand as his intel was newer. He wasted that advantage. His "surprise" if there was one, was that his rear guard was the one who made contact. For two fast moving forces, hitting the rear is a surprise. But then again Hampton's deployment of forces doing a route reconnaissance when a zone reconnaissance was called for was another error. He should have been using multiple routes to fing the enemy, rather than one route.

11) One of the reasons I asked about which manual was used for the definition of meeting engagement is that I would want to use the term of the period and its definition rather than a current definition... Meeting engagement as a term may be an old one whose definition has evolved. Compare apples to apples as a frame of reference to be fair. Likewise I would not want to take a new term and apply it to the past unless I was clear about the definition. "Classical" definitions were at one time "new" etc. For example the classical definition of a home, went from a cave, to a hut, to a building to what we might have today... so "classical" covers alot... almost to where anything might fit.

Perhaps again in the world of writers and historians a "group think" has occurred on this and is acceptable in that group. I would humbly suggest, that we should all strive to as accurate as we can. Kinda like if I contract to build a home, I don't expect a cave....

Respectfully, Bill

[Chuck]

Friends,

I’ve been gone a week and returned surprised that Tactical Bill’s assessment of what happened on the Federal right on July 2 has not actually been addressed, other than the side issue of how to define “meeting engagement.”

Lest his perceptive comments be submerged in Cyberspace and forgotten, let me highlight some of the key observations TB made that seem to substantiate Troy Harman’s thesis about Kilpatrick being on a specially assigned mission, that his engagement at Hunterstown was not accidental nor unexpected.

I find TB's analysis to be fresh and compelling, and contrary to what has been the popular interpretation of what happened.

Yours with respect,

Chuck


Exerpts from Tactical Bill's posts:

[The General]

Chuck,

Somehow, I'm not the tiniest little bit surprised to hear that.

Eric
_________________
"If you want to have some fun, jine the cav'ry!"