Lemme try this again. NO ONE is saying they didn't have a valid concern. The flanks are a valid concern (hell, they're a main concern). This is way off the point.
What several folks here, myself included, are saying is that there's no evidence there was a specific concern related to a movement or preparation for attack on that flank, that had anything to do with Hunterstown. Sure, we can speculate about it all day. We can speculate that Kilpatrick knew Stuart was heading for Hanover on June 30 and ambushed him. Ain't anywhere near the truth (it was a meeting engagement as was Hunterstown) but I'm sure one or two people in the last 140 years or so have made such an unsubstantiated assertion.
Two facts: there isn't a scintilla of evidence for Harman's assertion. Second, ALL known sources instead point to it being a meeting engagement. I would love to find evidence to the contrary, and would love to include that in a revision to the book Eric and I just completed. It would be quite a coup.
However, such an assertion not only is not supported by any known sources, primary or otherwise, it also flies in the face of logic as well.
Interesting to banter about, but fall flat in the face of scholarship.
Cashtown to Mummasburg to Shriver's Corner to Hunterstown?" No wonder you need a county map to find it. It's so far out it isn't even on most maps of the battlefield area. Jim
Good point. I think everyone tends to envision the area of battle operations as being more condensed than it really was.
The road in question was indeed a significant one used by the Confederates to move laterally out of view of the Yankees.
For example, note Kent Masterson Brown's observation of how this very road was heavily used in the retreat: "Stuart's cavalry brigades, with all their trains, moved toward the newly formed defense lines on a road north of Gettysburg that connected Hunterstown with Mummasburg. With the long column of wagons and ambulances were the 150 wagons pulled by 900 mules captured by Stuart on 28 June.... Now the wagons were mostly filled with sick and wounded; the empty ones would soon be filled...."
I woudn't be surprised if Ewell used the road for his trains as well.
Joined: Feb 27, 2005 Posts: 38 Location: Gettysburg
Posted: Fri Jul 08, 2005 7:27 pm Post subject: Hunterstown
Hi J.D.,
JD wrote:
NO ONE is saying they didn't have a valid concern. The flanks are a valid concern
My point is simply that it was a concern that was specified in the directive given to Kilpatrick.
JD wrote:
...there's no evidence there was a specific concern related to a movement or preparation for attack on that flank....
I think it is always helpful to clarify where we disagree. I see it being a concern particularly specified by both Kilpatrick and Pleasonton, thus "specific."
I do look forward to reading your book and learning from it. I find that there is always more to discover about Gettysburg, which is one reason it has been a fascination for me during the past four decades.
Joined: Feb 08, 2004 Posts: 644 Location: Pittsburgh, PA
Posted: Fri Jul 08, 2005 9:15 pm Post subject:
Maybe I'm missing something. Hopefully you guys can clear this up for me.
Why can the movement of Custer to Hunterstown, and the engagement with Hampton, not still be a meeting engagement if the Federals were moving out of concern for a Confederate shift to the Federal right?
Harry _________________ "Dulce bellum inexpertis" - Erasmus (though some say Pindaros)
Joined: Feb 27, 2005 Posts: 38 Location: Gettysburg
Posted: Fri Jul 08, 2005 9:23 pm Post subject:
Hi Harry,
It's always good for you to chime in. :^)
Harry wrote:
Why can the movement of Custer to Hunterstown, and the engagement with Hampton, not still be a meeting engagement if the Federals were moving out of concern for a Confederate shift to the Federal right?
I'm not one to argue the point. Based upon the O.R.s of Pleasonton and Kilpatrick, my sense is that they expected to find Confederates there, alerted that the enemy might be maneuvering to strike the Federal right flank. I don't think the Rebels had any particular reason to expect an engagement there.
RickAllen Official Chronicler of Gettysburg Tours!
Joined: Feb 13, 2004 Posts: 4285 Location: Baltimore, Maryland
Posted: Fri Jul 08, 2005 10:14 pm Post subject:
Legitimate question IMHO.
I love shooting down legitimate questions, but I can't do it here, I know nothing about this thing. Like a red-headed step-child, it must either be beaten or adopted.
Posted: Sat Jul 09, 2005 4:53 pm Post subject: Re: Hunterstown
Chuck wrote:
Jungles wrote:
Cashtown to Mummasburg to Shriver's Corner to Hunterstown?" No wonder you need a county map to find it. It's so far out it isn't even on most maps of the battlefield area. Jim
Good point. I think everyone tends to envision the area of battle operations as being more condensed than it really was.
The road in question was indeed a significant one used by the Confederates to move laterally out of view of the Yankees.
For example, note Kent Masterson Brown's observation of how this very road was heavily used in the retreat: "Stuart's cavalry brigades, with all their trains, moved toward the newly formed defense lines on a road north of Gettysburg that connected Hunterstown with Mummasburg. With the long column of wagons and ambulances were the 150 wagons pulled by 900 mules captured by Stuart on 28 June.... Now the wagons were mostly filled with sick and wounded; the empty ones would soon be filled...."
I woudn't be surprised if Ewell used the road for his trains as well.
Yours with respect,
Chuck
Well, that's fine, and Stuart did indeed use the route to join up with the army. But you're still far from showing that Longstreet being spotted moving east on the Fairfield road, nowhere even remotely near the road you're talking about, led Meade to conclude he was on the way to Hunterstown.
As J.D. stated above, there's absloutely no evidence to suggest that Meade saw a specific threat to Hunterstown, or that the cavalry action there was anything but a meeting engagement. The very broad and general statements you've quoted about protecting the flank simply don't support an assertion of that degree of specificity.
Joined: Feb 27, 2005 Posts: 38 Location: Gettysburg
Posted: Sat Jul 09, 2005 6:41 pm Post subject: Re: Hunterstown
Jungles wrote:
you're still far from showing that Longstreet being spotted moving east on the Fairfield road, nowhere even remotely near the road you're talking about, led Meade to conclude he was on the way to Hunterstown. As J.D. stated above, there's absloutely no evidence to suggest that Meade saw a specific threat to Hunterstown...
Jim, we do know that Meade had received intelligence that the Rebels were moving a large force toward the Union right. That is evident in the 1:30 pm report on July 2 from the Union signal station at Little Round Top. The message in particular reads: "A heavy column of enemy's infantry, about 10,000 strong, is moving from opposite our extreme left toward our right."
Meade would sensibly look at a map to see how this could possibly happen. The lateral road north of Gettysburg and beyond sight of Cemetery Hill by which the Rebels might accomplish this maneuver is the very road in question. And it passes through Hunterstown. That Meade would direct Pleasonton to marshal what forces he could to frustrate a Rebel movement against his right is quite understandable.
That this is what the Union high command is assuming is not only evident in the reports of Pleasonton and Kilpatrick. It is also suggested by Lieut. Jerome's urgent message to Howard on Cemetery Hill: "Over a division of the rebels is making a flank movement on our right..."
Now, in point of fact, both messages relate mistaken intelligence. From hindsight we know better. But Meade would presumably take these reports seriously and propose some counteraction. What he apparently did is to have cavalry (which would be Kilpatrick) engage the Rebels before they could actually form to attack the Union right.
Meade didn't see what you deem a "specific threat to Hunterstown," as that community was not something he was disposed to protect. What Meade was concerned with was the threat to his army. Jerome, by the way, says that "there is nothing but cavalry to oppose them." What cavalry? It must be Kilpatrick.
I am not 100% hardcore asserting that this must be so. I am simply trying to connect all the bits of evidence that we have to try to make sense of why Kilpatrick was moving on Hunterstown. Here we have four key pieces of evidence that suggest that it was not coincidence, that Kilpatrick was not simply on the flank doing customary patrols, but that there was a perceived threat and that he had been given a specified mission.
There's one very major flaw in this argument--that Jerome message was actually a day one message that was misfiled. It was Jerome reporting the flanking movement of Early's division just before it crashed into Barlow.
By the time of this so-called flanking maneuver, Jerome was in Maryland with the rest of Buford's division. Given that Jerome was the signal officer specifically assigned to Buford's division, there is no reason why he would have/should have still been in Gettysburg late on the afternoon of July 2. If he had been, something would have been very wrong indeed.
Eric _________________ "If you want to have some fun, jine the cav'ry!"
Thanks Eric, you jumped in before I too could jump all over that post... :drunken:
Yes Chuck, that missive from Jerome dated July 2 is actually July 1. This was actually one gem I was saving instead of bringing it up in our prior discussions over the situation north of town on JULY 1 (read that Devin's sector). It's one of the things that contradicts your assertions about Devin's cavalry's performance in disputing the Confederate advance at that time. Anyway, not to get off point...
Eric is quite correct. Jerome had left the field with Buford's two brigades by noon on July 2. Everything you've just posted, Chuck, happened on July 1, not July 2.
Further, Kilpatrick had been issued no orders to react to any Confederate movements on the afternoon of July 2, by either Pleasonton or Meade.
As I said several times, Hunterstown was a meeting engagement, pure and simple. Hampton was only trying to get through Hunterstown toward Gettysburg (following Stuart) and his rear guard was attacked by Kilpatrick, who likewise had no idea he would clash with anyone. Anything beyond that contradicts ALL primary sources.
Joined: Feb 27, 2005 Posts: 38 Location: Gettysburg
Posted: Sat Jul 09, 2005 10:24 pm Post subject: Hunterstown
Hi guys!
It's a busy night in Gettysburg, with Saturday night of Bike Week. I've had to spend much of the evening "patrolling" the sidewalks as police chaplain, but am glad to report everything is quiet if noisy (how's that for a contradiction in terms).
Eric wrote:
There's one very major flaw in this argument--that Jerome message was actually a day one message that was misfiled. It was Jerome reporting the flanking movement of Early's division just before it crashed into Barlow.
That could be. A problem with this as I see it, however, is that Early's attack upon Barlow, primarily involved Gordon, who actually shifted right (not left) to align with Doles. It was not truly a flanking movement, although the Rebels did somewhat in fact wrap around both of Barlow's flanks.
It wouldn't be the first time a message in the O.R.'s was misfiled. That the date is inserted certainly adds to the possibility. And the fact that the message goes from Jerome to Howard struck me as odd. I will acknowledge that it is probably July 1. Thank you, Eric and J.D., for pointing out this probable error in the O.R.'s.
J.D. wrote:
Everything you've just posted, Chuck, happened on July 1, not July 2.
I'm sorry, but I don't follow you. We still have the message from Little Round Top, speaking about the enemy's move from "our" left to right. This certainly is July 2, and seems to confirm Troy's thesis. Do I read you right that you are actually contending that the LRT message is July 1?
J.D. wrote:
Yes Chuck, that missive from Jerome dated July 2 is actually July 1. This was actually one gem I was saving instead of bringing it up in our prior discussions over the situation north of town on JULY 1 (read that Devin's sector). It's one of the things that contradicts your assertions about Devin's cavalry's performance in disputing the Confederate advance at that time.
Well, not to chase two rabbits at a time, but the only flanking movement made by the Rebels north of town on July 1 was by Doles. Rodes did shift Doles to the left (to the right of the Union line) and, yes, Devin's men were the only force there to oppose the enemy. As we know, Devin was at Blocher's Knoll when this was happening. But, again, Gordon did not shift left (i.e., not "on our right") nor was it a flank movement he made.
Jerome's message does make sense in light of what was happening in the early afternoon of July 1, before Barlow arrived. In fact, Jerome's message probably helped prompt Howard to send Barlow out to preclude Doles from striking Schimmelfennig on his exposed flank.
However, this does help me to understand why you have been adamant that Devin was protecting Barlow's flank. We still have a difference of understanding here, however, because I do think this likely references Schimmelfenning's flank earlier in the afternoon.
Not "probable," that message from Jerome is definitely from July 1.
And it prompted Howard to do absolutely nothing, as a letter I have from Devin's adjutant Ferguson Easton (from his descendant) bears out, which is quoted in the manuscript I'm working on.
Posted: Sun Jul 10, 2005 11:07 am Post subject: Re: Hunterstown
[quote="Chuck
Meade would sensibly look at a map to see how this could possibly happen. The lateral road north of Gettysburg and beyond sight of Cemetery Hill by which the Rebels might accomplish this maneuver is the very road in question. And it passes through Hunterstown. That Meade would direct Pleasonton to marshal what forces he could to frustrate a Rebel movement against his right is quite understandable.
What he apparently did is to have cavalry (which would be Kilpatrick) engage the Rebels before they could actually form to attack the Union right.
[/quote]
J.D. and Eric have already pointed out the matter of Jerome's message actually being from the day before. But even if it wasn't a day old, it clearly references enemy troops already on the scene, not spotted on the other side of town, supposedly headed in that general direction.
Which brings me back to Longstreet's troops seen heading east, a couple of miles out west of town. I still haven't seen anything showing what that has to do with the road way up north of Gettysburg, running east to Hunterstown. From where Longstreet was to Hunterstown is the better part of 10 miles, even marching direct, say, through the town and out the York Pike. Longer than that by, I would guess, a good couple of miles if he marches via the northern route. And how does he get to this northern route without being seen? If he marches north from the town area, he'll be spotted. Does he backtrack to Cashtown of Mummasburg. Unlikely, and even more miles.
Best case, even by the most direct or even reasonably direct routes, he 5 or 6 hours away from Hunterstown, and even longer to close up and form enough infantry to mount an attack on the Union right. In other words, if he's going to Hunterstown, he's not attacking from there on the 2nd if there's to be any worthwhile daylight yet.
Bottom line is, even if Longstreet was thought to be heading to the Hunterstown area when spotted west of town, there's not going to be anyone there for Kilpartick to have to worry about for a long time.
Joined: Feb 27, 2005 Posts: 38 Location: Gettysburg
Posted: Sun Jul 10, 2005 11:46 am Post subject: Re: Hunterstown
Hi Jim,
I do candidly admit that I have not always been right. Indeed, that is how I learn. I have a deep respect for Lincoln and Grant precisely because both men were continually willing to consider new perspectives, and to learn from their mistakes.
Even apart from Jerome, let's review key bits of evidence. At 1:30 pm a large force of Confederates was spotted from LRT heading east toward the Federal right. They were not further seen from Cemetery Hill, as might be expected. The road heading east beyond sight of Cemetery Hill was the road that led through Hunterstown (Buford had noted the day before that Rebels were making much use of that road). Pleasonton said he then ordered Kilpatrick to move to prevent the Rebels from concentrating their forces and to preclude them from turning the right flank of the Federal line. Kilpatrick confirmed he was thus ordered to move out to protect the AoP right and, in doing so, encountered Stuart near Hunterstown.
You and I know that Longstreet turned his column south out of view of the Yankees, and headed for their left flank rather than their right flank. Did Meade or Pleasonton know this at the time? No.
As we try to reconstruct what the key commanders were thinking, I wish we did have more evidence. But to my mind, Meade was focused the first half of July 2 on his right, ignoring Sickles' role on his left. I think the signal corps message, Pleasonton's orders, and Kilpatrick's experience help us to see his concerns more clearly.
To my mind (and apparently that of Troy Harman and Mike Vallone) these pieces of evidence are connected. You and J.D. do not see it that way. That's fine with me.
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