Waterloo (couldn't have won if I wanted to)

[James_Longstreet]

Didn't know where to post this (we don't have anything relating to 'tactics'), so finally figured that this section will suffice.

Just watched "Command Decisions - Waterloo' on History Channel and, BOY-OH-BOY....

Bony unleaches a terrific Arty Barrage (80 or so guns) against the Wellington's Center. Wellington orders his man to lay low on the opposite slope of the ridge until the Barrage stops.

Once that is done - the Imperial Guard is ordered forward (and off they go - 10,000 strong, splendid as on the parade) and once they get really close- BAM!! - the Infantry behind the stone wa....er.... the other side of the ridge rushes forward and delivers a staggering volley

The Imperial Guard wavers, then breaks and runs - END OF the Battle (OK, OK there IS Blucher....)

Hmm, does this sounds familiar or WHAT?!?!?
_________________
I Remain
Your Ob't Servant
Allan
Time sets all things right. Error lives but a day. Truth is eternal.
A Great Civilization is not Conquered from Without until It has Destroyed Itself from Within

[Ryan]

This kind of thing happened a lot during the Napoleonic Wars. I can think of about half a dozen battles on the Peninsula alone where something very similar occurred. Of course, Wellington fought on the Peninsula while Bony was off in Russia...

[PatrickDunn]

A lot more came into play that day than the Brits stepping up in the
high grass and pouring a few volleys into Napoleons Guard.

Napoleon was sick, the rains during the night made the French
solid shot inefective, there was an errant Cav. charge, and let's
not forget about the Advance of the Prussians. Not to mention
Napoleon sent 1/3 of his army on a wild goose chase. On a dry
field of battle history would have been altered forever.

Waterloo on paper was a win for Napoleon. Conditions and
events were against him ( fate )

Day 3 was a win on paper for Lee - conditions and events were
also against him ( also fate )

Lee said after the war that for some reason "not clear to him"
that Pickett was not properly supported = failure. A supported /
sustained assault on the Federal center would have most likely
had the desired effect of Lee's plan of battle.

One has to wonder what effect a breakthrough would have had
on the commands north and south of Cenetery Ridge ? There is
a scenario to ponder?

I do so wish he had been more detailed in that answer.

jeff

[James_Longstreet]

Jeff, I'm not disputing that there is a lot more to the story than meets the simple eye - I was just merely struck by similarity.

However, with all due respect - how do you figure that Day 3 is a success for Lee "on paper"? I mean, ANYTHING could be a win 'on paper'. But the 'paper' is suppose to take into concideration the existing conditions and events before it becomes THE 'paper' du jour, whouldn't you agree? Another words - when planning your next move - work under what is known to you and then throw couple of allowances for the unknown.
Not only Lee is wrong on his attacking force (we all know there were no 15,000 men in that line), but somehow McGilvery's line is completely overlooked, even if it IS in plain view from certain portions of the Field!!!!
There is still no clearly defined co-operation between various Corps' units (Rodes sitting in the Long Lane doing nothing while Brockenbrough slightly to his right is getting shot to pieces) and of course, Meade's final 'ace', which too many choose to 'conveniently' forget - the Artillery Reserve!

If his plan was a success on 'paper', I humbly propose that the 'paper' was just as delusional as Marse Rob't himself - there were too many presumptions that were not based on cold hard existing facts....

Shouldda listened to me from da get-go!
_________________
I Remain
Your Ob't Servant
Allan
Time sets all things right. Error lives but a day. Truth is eternal.
A Great Civilization is not Conquered from Without until It has Destroyed Itself from Within

[PatrickDunn]

Conditions and events dictate outcome. That was my point in saying that
Waterloo was a victory for Napoleon under different circumstances.

No different at Gettysburg. Longstreet said no army could reach that wall
but in fact they did. Conditions were not "perfect" but when were their
ever perfect conditions in most battles of the Civil war.

Meade punched a hole in Lee's lines at Fredericksburg and failure to
support his breakthrough resulted in loss. Would you say events would
have been the same if Lee's lines were divided that day ?

In any case, I don't agree that Lee was "delusional" on that day
or any day. Taking everything into consideration, it is not possible
to judge what worked and what did not. Federal arms and "moral"
were superior on that day. Up till that day how many times did Lee
factor in the Federal response to percieved threats. Yankees had a
tendency to run when rattled. No leader in that war fought harder
with less man and arms than Lee. "After the fact" history has always
disturbed me. Put any Federal General in Lee's shoes at Gettysburg
and consider that post war history.

Confederate arms were poor. Their powder was terrible and their
arms no where equal to the guns positioned on the other side.
I still say under better conditions that "plan" was an option. Just
as Grants was at Cold Harbor. If Picketts brigade was intact, and
if Lee had the support of all of his generals a supported break in the
line could have produced a state of panic in Meades center.

Also, regarding artillery - Confederate arms were in no way equal
to the Federal batteries. Federal artillery could have been disrupted
on Cemetery ridge and in Zieglers Grove but it wasn't, true, but I
believe that falls under failure of material, not failure of foresight.

Not happy with this as an answer but it's a quick response to what
we are working on here. I do believe that every battle - from the
fields of Troy to the present are dictated by factors that we do not
always control. Fate perhaps ?

[James_Longstreet]

Jeff, I will Respectfully disagree on some points.
First and foremost -

[markpeters]

Sorry,

I disagree here :cheers:

Waterloo was not a win on paper for Napoleon. He was out generalled and generally outfought. Mistakes and failures count as being outfought. He who makes less mistakes wins. Wellington never lost a battle due to his abilities under pressure. Not his fault that Napoleon suffered stage fright when up against the master.

Just for the record, Wellington never lost a battle!

Hey, it's good to ber back :drunken:
_________________
"History must not be written with bias, and both sides must be given, even if there is only one side." JOHN BETJEMAN

[James_Longstreet]

[markpeters]

Thanks Allan,

It is good to be back (really) and actually looking forward to work later today. I'm fit(ish) and raring to go. :bounce:

You'll be pleased to know that I haven't converted to Maoism, or any other other 'red' philosophy, and am still a card carrying Tory. :cheers:

With regards to Waterloo, I think that Voltaire summed up the situation quite well, for a Frenchman, by writing that "... victory belongs not to the biggest battalions but to the best shots."

The number of comparisons that could be made between Waterloo and Gettysburg are quite startling. I think that the recent discussion highlights one of the most interesting. Rather than giving credit to Wellington and Meade for their victories, many chose to think that it was a matter of Napoleon and Lee losing their respective battles instead. You could turn this on its head, look at any battle and say that Lee should not have won at Fredericksburg as Burnside lost the battle, etc. hence, my point about making less mistakes and working within the limitations of subordinates, quality of troops, etc.

Your point about Napoleon and Lee showing a lack of judgement on launching attacks on the centres of their opposition was well made, and DID finally decide the respective battles. Both attacks were made in desparation and wishful thinking that the flanks had been strengthened, throughout the battle, at the expense of the centres. Both made the assumption and both were proved fatally wrong!

In addition, subordinates of Wellington and Meade also made major mistakes. What made the difference was that the winning commanders were able to indentify, and rectify, these errors as they happened. Not compound the errors as Napoleon and Lee did!

VICTORIES ON PAPER, INDEED. HUMBUG! :albino:

Best wishes,

Comrade Mark
_________________
"History must not be written with bias, and both sides must be given, even if there is only one side." JOHN BETJEMAN

[PatrickDunn]

To the original point,

If the weather had been kinder to Napoleon Waterloo is most
certainly a win for Napoleon. His pre - attack artillery display
would have driven the Allies from the field as it always did. The
muddy fields attributed to 90% of what went wrong that day.

The battle started late, solid shot and explosive shot either
sank into the soft ground or exploded with little impact. The
Discovery Channel did an in depth experiment on just that
and concluded that this was the reason that Waterloo was lost.
All troop movement following the failed bombardment was
effected by this fact.

That was why I said his original plan of attack was a win on
paper. Events that unfolded after the plan was drawn up -
weather being the prine factor to outcome - led to the defeat.

Give Napoleon a sucessful artillery barrage, DRY fields and a
early start and that is a different battle.

As for day 3 at Gettysburg, I have re-thought my initial position
and stand corrected. Lee's artillery had no chance to break up
the Federal position across the field and with no support it was
doomed to fail.

[markpeters]

I take your point about the bad weather, but feel that an important point is being missed here. Wellington placed the majority of his troops on the reverse slope, so were immune to the artillery. Hence, the effectiveness of Somerset in the centre. He had gone through the whole battle virtually unscathed.

Those who were facing, were nearly all Dutch troops of dubious quality and loyalty. They fled, but succeeded in keeping a 'hesitant' Napoleon occupied for a while. The facing slopes were only occupied in response to the cavalry attacks of Ney, who essentially succeeded in blocking his artillery.

Wellington knew the site, like the back of his hand. As with Meade, Wellington had a major advantage over his opponent in this area. Another of those interesting similarities.

The one plus for Napoleon, over Lee, was that he had actually tried to get Wellington to weaken his centre. Lee just believed Meade's centre would be weak as a result of days 1 and 2.

Best wishes,

Mark
_________________
"History must not be written with bias, and both sides must be given, even if there is only one side." JOHN BETJEMAN

[James_Longstreet]

[markpeters]

Jeff,

Whilst pondering upon what has been written about tactics, particularly in attack, did I read correctly that you thought Grant's frontal attack at Cold Harbour was an option? If so, could you please explain how any sane man could have considered this a 'viable option', and even attempt to carry this out. Cold Harbour makes Burnside's attempts, at Fredericksburg, emminently sensible!

With regards to Napoleon, the Russian Campaign was basically 1812. The Peninsula Campaign went on for a number of years prior to this. Where was Napoleon, whilst Wellington was destroying French armies in detail? Chalking up easy victories against the Italian States, Austro-Hungary, the German States, the Netherlands, Poland and Egypt.

It's a bit like Bobby Lee building up his reputation, winning victories against the likes of Burnside, Hooker, etc. At the end of the day, when he came up against quality opposition, he was often found wanting. Still, maybe that's a bit too controversial ...

Best wishes,

Mark
_________________
"History must not be written with bias, and both sides must be given, even if there is only one side." JOHN BETJEMAN

[Ryan]

[James_Longstreet]